柏拉图主义的德勒兹式逆转（完结）

参考文献：

注释：

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe , ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969 ), iii, iii, p. 207.

2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings , eds. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005 ), p. 171.

3 Ibid.

4 For a brief account of the concept of the simulacrum in twenti-eth-century French thought, see Daniel W. Smith , “The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism,” Continental Philosophy Review 38 ( 2006 ): 89–90. Whilst the concept of the simulacrum is not Bergsonian, I would be tempted to include Bergson ’s thought in a discussion of its impact and use in twenti-eth-century French philosophy. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory , trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004 ), begins with the claim that the world as a whole consists of “images, in the vaguest sense of the word” (p. 1), yet in a sense that does not presuppose an original, of which they would be the copy.

5 Smith, “The Concept of the Simulacrum,” p. 93.

6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future , eds. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, trans. JudithNorman (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 4. In the still stronger words of The Antichrist : “Christianity has taken the side of everything weak, base, failed, it has made an ideal out of whatever contradicts the preservation instincts of a strong life” (Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings , p. 5).

7 For a precise account of the historical sources behind Deleuze’s claim, see Smith, “The Concept of the Simulacrum,” pp. 91–93.

8 It is not by chance that Deleuze saw in modern, and especially pop art an anti-Platonic move within the history of art , one that philosophy, in its quest to move beyond representation and produce another image, could draw inspiration from: “The theory of thought is like painting: it needs the revolution which took art from representation to abstrac-tion” ( DR 354). On the relation between Deleuze’s anti-Platonism and his views regarding modern art, see Paul Patton , “Anti-Platonism and Art,” in Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (eds.), Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy (New York and London: Routledge, 1994 ), pp. 141–55. From Duchamp to Warhol, Patton remarks, modern art “has come to see its task not as the representa-tions of appearances, but as their repetition; not as the production of copies, but as the production of simulacra” (p. 143).

9 See Plato’s Sophist , 264b–268d.

10 The three major dialogues that present this method of division are the Phaedrus (265d–266b), the Statesman (258b ff.), and the Sophist (218a–232a; 252e–254b).

11 “To participate” ( μετέχω ) is, quite literally, “to have after,” and means to enjoy a share of, share in, take part in. It has the sense of having something, then, but second-hand.

12 For a more detailed account of the Sophistic overturning of Platonism, see Gregor Flaxman, “Plato,” in Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (eds.), Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage (Edinburgh University Press, 2009 ), pp. 18–24.

13 Smith, “The Concept of the Simulacrum,” p. 105.

14 LS 276. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura , trans. W. H. D. Rouse (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1992 ), 4: 732ff.

15 LS 335, n.4. Since Deleuze himself doesn’t elaborate on this connec-tion beyond the footnote mentioned, we can only speculate as to what the Epicurean theory of the event might be. As a result, an unresolved tension runs through Deleuze’s analysis: whereas Epicureanism is a radical materialism, and would envisage a theory of the event and, as we saw briel y, of time, only as matter, Deleuze insists that the time of the event, which he distinguishes from the time of bodies, is independ-ent of all matter ( LS 62).

16 Deleuze follows and interprets freely two main secondary sources: É mile Br é hier ’s concise but illuminating Lathé orie des incorporels dans l’ancien sto ï cisme (Paris: Vrin, 1997 [ 1928 ]), and Victor Goldschmidt ’s more substantial Le syst è me sto ï cien et l’idé e de temps (Paris: Vrin, 1998 [ 1953 ]). On the question of time, which Br é hier discusses briely in his final chapter, and which is the focus of Goldschmidt’s mono-graph, it is important to note that Deleuze selects freely between vari-ous Stoic positions, and seems to privilege Plutarch’s over Chrysippus’ (at least as presented by Arius). See Br é hier, La théorie des incorporels , p. 58.

17 Plato, Sophist , 247e.

18 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos , trans. R. G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997 ), viii , 263.

19 Plato, Parmenides , 130d.

20 See Albert Lautman, Essai sur les notions de structure et d’existence en math é matiques (Paris: Hermann, 1938 ), vol. ii , pp. 148–49.

21 My emphasis. See also Br é hier, La th é orie des incorporels , pp. 57–59.

22 Deleuze follows Goldschmidt’s analysis in Le syst è me sto ï cien , pp. 36–40.

23 LS 61. This is what Plutarch means when, in Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions (chapter 41), he writes that “in the time that is present, one part is to come, and the other past” ( Plutarch’s Moralia , trans. Harold Cherniss, Loeb Classical Library, vol. xiii , part ii [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976 ]). In a very simi-lar way, Diogenes Laertius claims that “in time past and future are unlimited but the present is limited” ( Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers , book vii , chapter vii , 140). Both are cited in Br é hier, La th é orie des incorporels , p 58.

24 According to Alain Badiou ’s Deleuze: The Clamor of Being , trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000 ), Deleuze fails to answer those questions convincingly. In fact, Badiou argues, far from overcoming and overturning Platonism , Deleuze’s thought consists in “a metaphysics of the One.” Despite his emphasis on multiplicities, difference, and diversity, Deleuze remains commit-ted to the univocity of being and a “Platonism of the virtual” which subordinates the actual to a new i gure of transcendence. For a further exploration in support of Badiou’s thesis, see Peter Hallward ’s Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (London: Verso, 2000 ). For a critical assessment of Badiou’s claim, see Nathan Widder, “The Rights of Simulacra: Deleuze and the Univocity of Being,” Continental Philosophy Review , 31:4 ( 2001 ), 437–53, and Miguel de Beistegui, “The Ontological Dispute,” in Gabriel Riera (ed.), AlainBadiou: Philosophy and Its Conditions (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2005 ), pp. 47–58.

25 An intensity , Deleuze argues, is “constituted by a difference which itself refers to other differences (E–E’ where E refers to e–e’ and e to ε – ε ’)” ( DR 117).

26 LS 261–62; DR 126.

27 In 1993, Deleuze wrote the following: “It seems to me that I have com-pletely abandoned the notion of the simulacrum” ( TRM 362).

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